Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the degree to which banks manage the information that they disclose to the public and regulators? We find that relaxing regulatory impediments to competition reduced discretionary loan loss provisioning and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks.
Introduction
When banks manipulate their financial statements, this can interfere with the monitoring, governance, and regulation of banks with harmful effects on the entire economy.
Banks frequently manage financial statements to (a) circumvent capital requirements (Ahmed et al., 1999; Collins et al., 1995) , (b) reduce taxes (Beatty and Liao, 2011) , and (c) smooth earnings (Beatty et al., 2002; Liu and Ryan, 2006) . Research also suggests that such manipulations can increase bank fragility (Bushman and Williams, 2012; Huizinga and Laeven, 2012; and Cohen et al., 2014) and reduce the quality of bank lending (Beatty and Liao, 2011) . More generally, King and Levine (1993a,b) , Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , and Beck et al (2000) suggest that any factor-including the manipulation of financial statements-that interferes with the sound oversight and governance of banks can distort capital allocation and slow economic growth.
Nonetheless, little is known about the impact of bank regulations on the extent to which banks manage their financial accounts. Although cross-country studies find that banks allocate capital more efficiently in countries that penalize bank executives for disclosing erroneous information (Barth et al., 2004 (Barth et al., , 2006 (Barth et al., , 2009 Beck et al., 2006) , unobserved country characteristics might account for these results. Moreover, researchers have not examined an array of bank regulations that might also shape earnings management. As stressed by Beatty and Liao (2014) , the lack of research on the regulatory determinants of financial disclosure in the banking industry is surprising given the importance of bank performance for economic prosperity, the deleterious effects of managing financial statements on bank performance, and the frequency with which banks manipulate their accounts.
In this paper, we provide the first assess of the impact of bank regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks on the degree to which banks manage the information that they disclose to the public and regulators. Theory offers conflicting perspectives on the impact of competition on the quality of financial statements. Scharfstein (1988) , Darrough and Stoughton (1990) , and Wagenhofer (1990) argue that competition can induce incumbent firms to manipulate the release of information to hinder the entry of rivals. Shleifer (2004) maintains that greater competition spurs executives to engage in less ethical behavior, including more aggressive accounting practices. Stein (1989) , von Thadden (1995) , and Kedia and Philippon (2009) show that competition can spur executives to manage their accounts to extract short-term rents. In contrast, other models stress that competition enhances the governance of firms, potentially compelling managers to disclose more reliable information to investors, e.g., Hart (1983) , Schmidt (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . Furthermore, since cross-firm comparisons help investors detect and deter earnings management (Dichev et al., 2013) , product market competition that facilitates such comparisons will enhance corporate transparency (Holmstrom, 1982) .
To evaluate these differing views on the impact of competition on quality of information disclosed by banks, we exploit three sources of variation in the cross-state, cross-time removal of regulatory impediments to bank competition during the last quarter of the 20 th century. First, individual states eliminated restrictions on intrastate branching. In particular, for much of the twentieth century, most states limited the ability of banks to compete with each other by imposing regulatory restrictions on banks establishing branch networks within states. States removed these barriers to competition in different years.
Second, interstate bank reforms eased regulatory impediments to competition, as bank holding companies (BHCs) headquartered in one state could now compete in other states by establishing subsidiaries in those states. As emphasized by Goetz et al. (2013) , not only did states begin interstate deregulation in different years, these reforms progressed in a state-specific process of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Thus, we use several time-varying measures of the degree to which a state's banking market was exposed to competition from BHCs in other states. Third, while the Riegle-Neal Act of 1995 effectively eliminated both intrastate branch and interstate bank restrictions, states had leeway in the timing of interstate branch deregulation, which is when BHCs in one state can establish branches-not just separately capitalized subsidiaries-in other states. Since the costs of establishing a branch are lower than the costs of establishing a subsidiary, interstate branch deregulation further lowered barriers to competition. Considerable research indicates these regulatory reforms spurred competition among banks (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003; Johnson and Rice, 2008) .
We use two types of proxies of disclosure quality. First, we use several measures of discretionary loan loss provisions (LLPs) . LLPs are the most important bank accrual through which banks manage earnings and regulatory capital (Beatty and Liao, 2014) . 1 To construct a proxy of discretionary LLPs (Dechow et al., 2010) , we first obtain the residuals from a model of the accruals of LLPs. Beatty and Liao (2014) assess alternative models and find that the residuals from one are particularly effective at predicting earning restatements and comment letters from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We estimate a similar form of this model, collect the residuals, and compute the logarithm of the absolute value of the residuals as our measure of discretionary LLPs, i.e., of "abnormal" accruals of LLPs. Since both positive and negative residuals may signal manipulation of LLPs, we use the absolute value of the residuals. Moreover, we show that the results are robust to using several alternative empirical models of LLPs, including some proposed by the literature on disclosure quality and some that we developed to address concerns with standard models of LLPs. The second type of proxy of disclosure quality is the frequency with which banks restate their earnings. Financial restatements have the advantage of measuring the actual correction of financial accounts, rather than estimating discretionary LLP by a regression residual.
However, since data on restatements are limited, we use both proxies for disclosure quality.
We employ a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to assess the impact of bank regulatory reforms that removed barriers to competition on the degree to which BHCs' discretionary LLPs may change. The dependent variable is a measure of discretionary LLPs for each BHC in each period (or a measure of financial restatements). The core independent variables are measures of intrastate branch, interstate bank, and interstate branch deregulation, which vary by state and year, and in some specifications vary by BHC-year. The analyses condition on BHC and year-quarter fixed effects and control for an array of time-varying BHC traits. Given data availability, we conduct the analyses over the period from 1986 through 2006 using quarterly data.
There are good reasons for treating the bank regulatory reforms as exogenous to discretionary LLPs. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) show that the timing of bank deregulation reflects the interaction between technology shocks at the national level and pre-existing conditions at the state level. Furthermore, several studies show that the timing of deregulation does not reflect bank performance (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Goetz et al., 2013) or state economic performance (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Morgan et al., 2004; Demyanyk et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2010) . Moreover, we demonstrate below that discretionary LLPs do not predict the timing of bank deregulation and there are no trends in LLPs prior to deregulation.
Our initial assessments suggest that regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to bank competition reduced discretionary LLPs. For each of the three different types of regulatory reforms, we find a negative, statistically significant, and economically large impact on discretionary LLPs. For example, consider the traditional measure of the timing of interstate bank deregulation as the year when a state first deregulated with any other state. We find that after this event, discretionary LLPs are half as large as they were before deregulation. As another example, consider our state-specific, time-varying measure of the process interstate bank deregulation. That is, for each state j in each year t, we measure the number of other states with which it has interstate banking agreements. We also consider variants of this deregulation measure that weights other states by their distance to state j and by the economic sizes of those other states. Our estimates indicate, for example, that when a state eliminates interstate banking restrictions with ten other states, discretionary LLPs fall by about 10%. We confirm these findings when examining financial restatements. There is a negative relationship between regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition and the frequency of financial restatements with the SEC.
These findings, however, are subject to a potentially important concern: Perhaps bank deregulation influences the quality of bank financial statements through some other mechanism besides an intensification of competition. Perhaps, when states lowered barriers to the entry of banks from other states, this triggered other changes that reduced disclosure quality. Even though the intrastate branch, interstate bank, and interstate branch deregulations were specifically designed to lower barriers to the contestability of banking markets and even though past research finds that these reforms intensified competition (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003; and Johnson and Rice, 2008) , this does not necessarily mean that deregulation boosted disclosure quality by intensifying competition.
Consequently, we offer a new approach for more precisely identifying the impact of competition on bank behavior that builds on Goetz et al. (2013 Goetz et al. ( , 2014 . The approach is based on the "gravity model" assumption that distance matters for investment and hence for the degree of competition faced by different BHCs in the same state. For example, after state j allows BHCs in state i to enter and establish subsidiaries in state j, two subsidiaries in state j may face different competitive pressures from state i, depending on their distance to state i.
More concretely, when California deregulates with Arizona, the banks in southern California may face greater competitive pressures from BHCs in Arizona than banks in northern California. By integrating this gravity model into the process of interstate bank deregulation, we build a time-varying, BHC-specific measure of regulatory-induced competition.
Specifically, we first construct measures of the competitive environment facing each subsidiary. For each subsidiary in each period, we identify those states whose BHCs can enter the subsidiary's state. We then weight each of those states by the inverse of its distance to the subsidiary. Second, after computing this inverse-distance measure of competition for all subsidiaries and time periods, we calculate the competitive environment facing a consolidated BHC by weighting these subsidiary level measures of competition by the proportion of each subsidiary's assets in the aggregate BHC. This approach also accounts for the fact that a BHC's competitive-environment will change as the states in which it has subsidiaries change their policies, which has not been previously addressed. For example, a BHC headquartered in state i with subsidiaries in other states will experience changes in competition as those other states deregulate, subjecting the BHC to greater competition even if state i does not open-up further to other states. In computing these BHC-specific-time competition measures based on regulations and distance, we also calculate and examine other measures that incorporate information on the economic sizes of different states.
Armed with these BHC-specific-time measures, we then re-do the analyses of the regulatory determinants of banks' abnormal accruals of LLPs while simultaneously including the original state-time indicators of interstate banking reforms and these BHC-specific-time measures of the competitive environment facing each BHC. If the earlier results were driven by a change in some state-time factor occurring when two states lower barriers to interstate banking, then the BHC-specific-time measure of competition should not provide additional explanatory power in the discretionary LLP analyses. If, however, increases in competition account for the earlier findings (and distance influences the contestability of markets), then we should find that these BHC-specific-time measures of competition influence discretionary LLPs beyond the state-time measures of interstate bank deregulation.
The BHC-specific-time measures of the regulatory-induced competitive pressures facing each BHC are strongly and negatively associated with discretionary LLPs even when including the original state-time measures discussed above. The findings are not driven by changes in regulation, supervision, or other policies at the state level. These findings further emphasize that interstate bank deregulation reduced discretionary LLPs.
Our work also contributes to the active debate on the impact of competition on literature on competition and corporate disclosure quality that has focused on nonfinancial firms. Ali et al., (2009) and Berger (2011) stress that challenge to finding sound proxies for competition and exogenous sources of variation in competition have helped yield inconclusive results on competition and corporate disclosure. Furthermore, while much of this literature uses cross-industry comparisons to assess the impact of competition on disclosure quality, other cross-industry differences make it difficult to draw causal inferences.
In contrast, we focus on one industry and offer a new strategy for assessing the impact of competition-enhancing reforms on banks' abnormal accruals of LLPs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and empirical methods.
Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 discusses robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
Data, Methodology, and the Validity of the Identification Strategy

Data on BHCs and states
The Federal Reserve provides consolidated balance sheets and income statements for BHCs on a quarterly basis starting in June 1986. We examine the ultimate parent BHC that owns, but is not owned by, other banking institutions, where we define ownership as 50% or more of the financial institutions equity. More specifically, we follow Goetz et al. (2013) and use code RSSD9364 in the Y-9C reports to link bank subsidiaries to the parent BHCs and code RSSD9364 to assign a subsidiary bank to the parent BHC if the latter owns at least 50% of the subsidiary's equity stake. In robustness tests, we examine individual commercial banks, rather than parent BHCs, using data from the Reports of Condition and Income ("Call Reports"), and obtain qualitatively similar results. We focus on the parent BHC results both because many commercial banks are not public listed and hence do not have stock price data and because diversification during our sample period occurred primarily through BHC subsidiaries, not through the branch networks of commercial banks. For stock prices, financial restatements, and state characteristics, we use several additional datasets. Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) has information on stock prices and outstanding shares. We construct a dataset on financial restatement information manually from 10-K, 10Q, and 8-K files from EDGAR, which gathers information from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings of public firms. The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides state-level data on social and economic demographics.
The dates of bank deregulation
We use the timing of three types of bank deregulation as exogenous sources of variation in the competitiveness of the banking market in each U.S. state. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, federal and state authorities reduced restrictions on (1) intrastate bank branching-the ability of banks to establish branches within a state, (2) interstate banking-the ability of banks to establish subsidiary banks across states, and (3) interstate branching-the ability of banks to establish branches across states. These policy changes increased the contestability of banking markets, as a broader array of banks within a state and from different states could compete to sell banking services. Reflecting this competition, deregulation reduced interest rates on loans, increased interest rates on deposits, and did so without boosting loan delinquency rates Strahan, 1996, 1998 Table 1 provides the dates of INTRA, INTER, and INTER-BRANCH for each state.
Estimating Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions
Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are a major, if not the major, mechanism through which banks manage both earnings and regulatory capital. There is not a consensus strategy or measure of the degree to which banks manipulate the information that they disclose to the public and regulators by managing their financial statements. One approach is to examine the frequency with which banks restate their financial statements and we examine this below. A second approach is to estimate a model of LLPs and use the absolute values of the residuals to construct indicators of the "abnormal" accrual of LLPs, i.e., as discretionary LLPs. This approach relies on estimating a sound model of LLPs. Beatty and Liao (2014) assess nine different LLP proposed by the banking literature. They find that one model performs particularly well in predicting earning restatements and comment letters from the Securities and Exchange Commission. We use a similar form of this model in our core analyses and then show that the results are robust to using alternative models LLPs to construct proxies of discretionary LLPs.
We construct discretionary LLPs for each BHC in each period using the following two-step procedure. We first run the core regression model highlighted by Beatty and Liao (2014) Specifically, we run the following regression:
In this model, !" represents the bank deregulation measures that we define above.
ijt represents the change in non-performing assets between quarter t and t-1 divided by total loans in quarter t-1 for BHC i in state j. Following Bushman and Williams (2012) , this model includes current period dNPA ijt and next period dNPA i,j,t+1 because banks might use current and forward-looking information on non-performing assets in selecting LLPs. The model includes dNPA i,j,t-1 since banks might use historical changes in non-performing assets in setting LLPs. 2 SIZE i,j,t-1 is the natural logarithm of total assets in quarter t-1 and is included because official supervisory oversight and private sector monitoring might vary with banks size. dLOAN ijt is the change in total loans over the quarter divided by lagged total loans. This is included to allow for the possibility that an increase in loans is associated with a decrease in loan quality. The model also includes three measures state characteristics that might influence LLP: CSRET jt , dGSP jt , and dUNEMP jt represent the return on the Case-Shiller Real Estate Index, the change in GSP, and the change in the state's unemployment rate, respectively. We also include state fixed effects, ST j , to account for any time invariant state characteristics that shape loan loss provisioning.
In the second step, we construct a proxy for the discretionary LLPs of each BHC in each quarter as the logarithm of the absolute values of the errors from estimating equation (1).
The errors represent the "abnormal" accrual of LLPs-the component of LLPs unexplained by the regression's fundamental determinants. We use the absolute value of the residuals because both positive and negative residuals may reflect discretionary manipulation of LLPs above and beyond that accounted for by the regressors in equation (1). An extensive literature uses errors from such models to proxy for earnings management (e.g., Beatty and Liao, 2014; Dechow et al., 1995 Dechow et al., , 2006 Dechow et al., , 2010 Yu, 2008; Jiang et al., 2010) . We interpret the results reported below under the maintained hypothesis that this proxy reflects the discretionary management of LLPs. As a robustness check, we also conduct the analyses by first averaging the residuals from the quarterly frequency to an annual frequency before taking the logarithm of the absolute value of the residuals and find the results highly robust. For brevity, the results are not presented but are available on request. Table 1 provides definitions of the variables used in the paper. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the sample obtained after dropping observations in which the core explanatory variables have missing values. In our sample, the median BHC has $1.1 billion in total assets (SIZE), while the average value of SIZE is $11.0 billion. Given the skewed distribution of bank size, we take the logarithm of total assets (logSIZE) in the regression analyses. Table 2 also shows that both the mean and the median of non-performing assets (NPA) in our sample is $10,000 per quarter. The median and mean of total loans (LOAN)) are $680 million and $5,880 million, respectively. In terms of the change in total loans scaled by beginning total loans (dLOAN), the mean and median are 0.03 and 0.02, respectively, which are much less skewed than LOAN.
Empirical Methodology
We examine the relationship between discretionary LLPs by BHCs and bank deregulation using a difference-in-differences methodology. This strategy allows us to control for all time-invariant BHC and state characteristics as well as all time effects.
Furthermore, we condition on a wide array of time-varying BHC characteristics. Our difference-in-differences methodology employs quarterly data on BHCs, and we confirm the findings when aggregating to an annual frequency. Thus, we evaluate the effect of deregulation on earnings management by estimating the following model:
where !"# is the measure of the manipulation of loan loss provisions by BHC i, headquartered in state j, in quarter t, and equals the logarithm of the absolute value of the residuals from equation (1). !" is bank deregulation in state j and in quarter t. For bank deregulation, we use the measures of intrastate, interstate bank, and interstate branch deregulation defined above. To emphasize, the deregulation measures used in each version of equation (2), are also used in the equation (1) estimation of LLPs. We also include
year-quarter fixed effects ( ! ) and BHC fixed effects ( ! ), and a vector !"# of time-varying BHC traits that might explain the management of LLPs. Specifically, following the literature on the quality of banks earnings statements (Beatty et al., 1995 (Beatty et al., , 2002 Liu and Ryan, 2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010) , !"# includes the logarithm of bank assets (logSIZE), one year lag of loan loss provision scaled by beginning total loans (LLP_lag), negative net income indicator variable (LOSS), and bank capital ratio (CAP). The results hold when including all of these !"# variables in the equation (1) model for LLPs. In robustness tests, we control for earnings before tax and provisions (EBTP) and obtain the same results, e.g., no difference in the statistical significance of or appreciable difference in the estimated coefficient on bank deregulation. We provide the estimates without EBTP since competition may influence discretionary LLPs through its effect on earnings. Similarly, the results are robust to controlling for the particular features of each BHC's loan portfolio, such as the proportion of real estate, commercial and industrial, agriculture, individual, and foreign loans. Including these loan types does not alter the findings.
On the validity of our approach
Drawing valid inferences from these regressions requires that the change in discretionary LLPs in deregulated and regulated states would have been the same in the absence of deregulation. If the trend in abnormal accruals of LLPs differed in deregulating non-deregulating states-if the treatment group had a different trend in outcomes from the control group, then our estimation strategy could yield erroneous inferences.
To assess the validity of our identification strategy, we conducted two types of analyses. First, we present graphs regarding the relationship between discretionary LLPs and the timing of interstate bank deregulation that illustrate (1) abnormal accruals of LLPs do not predict the timing of deregulation and (2) the reduction in abnormal accruals occurs immediately after a state started the process of interstate bank deregulation. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of discretionary LLPs before and after interstate bank deregulation. We start by making year zero the year when a state started interstate bank deregulation. Then, time for each state is centered at year zero, such that one quarter before deregulation is -1 and one quarter after deregulation is +1. We then run the following regression:
where the deregulation dummy variable !" !! equals one for banks in the nth quarter after deregulation, and the deregulation dummy variable !" !! equals one for banks in the nth quarter before deregulation, and ! and ! are state-quarter and BHC fixed effects, respectively. We consider a 20-quarter window, spanning from ten quarters before until ten quarters after deregulation. We then plot the estimated coefficients on the deregulation dummies and provide 5% confidence intervals. where EBTP equals income before taxes and provisions in million U.S. dollars. The discretionary LLPs is the absolute value of discretionary LLPs estimated from equation (1) multiplied by the value of the lag of total loans, which is also measured in million U.S.
dollars. Similarly, we still consider a 20-quarter window, spanning from ten quarters before until ten quarters after deregulation. The median EBTP of our sample BHCs is $3.02 million, and the median of discretionary LLPs is $0.43 million. In Figure 2 , we find similar trend for the D-LLP/EBTP that it has large fluctuations during the pre-deregulation period, with the mean ratio around 30%. In contrast, during the post-deregulation period, this ratio quickly reduced to about 13%, and became much more stable than before. In the meantime, we do not find statistical significant increases in EBTP during the post deregulation period. This is because there is no increase in the overall credit demand, and the reduced costs in banking after deregulation have been passed along to bank customers in the form of lower loan rates (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Rice and Strahan, 2010 As shown, discretionary LLPs do not predict the timing of any of the regulatory reforms. There is no evidence that the degree to which BHCs manipulate the information that they disclose to the public or regulators altered the decision of officials to eliminate restrictions on intrastate branching, eased regulatory impediments to interstate banking, or lowered barriers to interstate branching. 5 (1985)) that are clustered at the state-quarter level. These regressions assess the impact of regulatory reforms that eased competition among banks on disclosure quality.
Main Results
Bank Regulatory Reforms and Discretionary LLPs
The results indicate that these regulatory reforms reduced discretionary LLPs. The estimated coefficients reported in With respect to the control variables, Table 3 indicates the following. Large BHCs tend to engage in more LLP management. This is consistent with the findings in Huizinga and Laeven (2012) who showed that larger banks have more discretion over asset valuation because they tend to have a larger fraction of hard-to-value assets, therefore, these banks tend to benefit more from the enhanced capability to do asset revaluation. We also find that discretionary LLPs are positively related to LOSS (i.e. an indicator variable takes the value of one if net income is negative and zero otherwise). These results suggest that when the bank makes a loss, there is an uptick in the management of LLPs. This result is consistent with findings in the earnings smoothing literature that banks manage income by either delaying or accelerating provisions for losses (Liu and Ryan, 2006) .
BHC-specific regulatory environment and discretionary LLP
There is a potentially important limitation to these state-time regulatory reform measures: They are not computed at the BHC-time level. Although considerable research finds that these regulatory reforms spurred competition among banks, this does not necessarily imply that these reforms reduced abnormal accruals of LLPs by intensifying competition. Perhaps, deregulation produced other changes that reduced discretionary LLPs, and it is these other changes-not increased competition-that accounts for the improvement in disclosure quality.
In light of this concern, we develop a new strategy for more precisely identifying the impact of competition on bank behavior. This strategy builds on the "gravity model," which predicts that the costs to a business of opening a new site are positively associated with the distance between the business's headquarters and the site. (Goetz et al., 2013 (Goetz et al., , 2014 . We build a BHC-specific-time measure of deregulation-induced competition by integrating this gravity model into the process of interstate bank deregulation.
More formally, we first construct measures of the competitive environment associated with interstate banking facing each subsidiary. For each subsidiary in each period, we identify those states whose BHCs can enter the subsidiary's state. We then weight each of those states by the inverse of its distance to the subsidiary. That is, we calculate the interstate bank competitive pressures facing a subsidiary, s, located in state j in period t as: 
where P s,b,t is the proportion of assets of each subsidiary, s, within BHC, b, in period t,
relative to the total assets of all of BHC b's subsidiaries. Thus, for each BHC in each period:
We also create two additional BHC-specific-time measures where we also weight by the economic sizes of different states (Gross State Product) and the number of BHCs in states.
We call these BHC_DIS_GSP and BHC_DIS_NUM, respectively. To illustrate the construction we BHC_DIS_GSP, we modify the computation of the regulatory-induced competitive pressures facing each subsidiary in each period:
We then proceed as above to construct BHC_DIS_GSP. In those cases where !,!,! !"# = 0, we include the value as 0.001.
based on regulations and distance, we also calculate and examine other measures that incorporate information on the economic sizes of different states.
With these BHC specific measures, we reexamine the regulatory determinants of bank opacity. In particular, we modify equation (2), so that it now simultaneously includes (a) the original state-time indicators of interstate banking reforms and (b) these new BHC-specific-time measures of the competitive environment facing BHCs.
If (a) the earlier results were driven by competition and (b) the distance of a potential competitor to a market influences the competitiveness of that market, then should enter negatively and significantly. If, however, the earlier results were driven by a change in some state-time factor occurring when two states lower barriers to interstate banking, then the BHC-specific-time measure of competition should not provide additional explanatory power in the discretionary LLP analyses.
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that interstate bank deregulation reduced discretionary LLP by intensifying the competitive pressures facing BHCs. In columns 1-3 of Table 5 , we first include three BHC-specific deregulation measures (BHC_DIS, BHC_DIS_GSP, and BHC_DIS_NUM) separately into the regression. As shown, they each enter negatively and significantly. In columns 4-6, we further control for the interstate deregulation dummy variable INTER, which equals one after a state first deregulates with any other state. Consistent with the competition channel, we find that each of the three BHC-specific deregulation measures enters negatively and significantly. Finally, in columns 7-9, we control for the evolution of interstate deregulation at the state level (Ln(# of States)).
Again, even when controlling for the dynamic process of interstate bank deregulation at the state-time level, we continue to find that the BHC-specific distance weighted measures of the competitive environment facing each BHC (BHC_DIS, BHC_DIS_GSP, and BHC_DIS_NUM) enter negatively and significantly. The evidence is consistent with the view that regulatory reforms that intensify the competition faced by a BHC tend to reduce the BHC's discretionary LLPs.
Extensions and Robustness Tests
Alternative Measures of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions
We considered alternative measures of the degree to which banks manipulate information disclosed to the public and regulators. In this subsection, we use different models of loan loss provisioning, collect the residuals from these models, and compute the logarithm of the absolute value of the residuals as alternative proxies of discretionary LLPs.
Specifically, we use four additional models described in Beatty and Liao (2014) . The first two models are simple modifications of their preferred model of LLPs:
Model (a) in Beatty and Liao (2014) :
Model (b) in Beatty and Liao (2014) :
The next two models are examined in Beatty and Liao (2014) , where one is from Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) :
The other and the final model is from Bushman and Williams et al. (2012) :
All of these models also include state fixed effects in predicting abnormal LLPs. As shown in Appendix 
A Different Measure of Information Manipulation
Rather than inferring the degree to which banks manipulate information disclosed to the public by using the residuals of an empirical model of LLPs, we also examined the frequency with which banks restate their earnings. When a bank restates earnings, it means that the bank either intentionally or unintentionally misstated earnings in the past. Such restatements could simply reflect a change in accounting standards or a mistake, and few restatements are criminally fraudulent. Nevertheless, restatements do represent a violation of appropriate accounting practices by managers and represent an alternative proxy of the management of information disclosed to the public.
Following Beatty and Liao (2014) , we manually search restatement information in 8-K, 10-K, and 10-Q files from EDGAR directly. 9 We create an indicator variable (RESTATEMENT) that equals one if a BHC restated its earnings in a year and zero otherwise.
Consequently, we conduct these analyses using annual data. Even though EDGAR's electronic files start in year 1996, our search through EDGAR's paper records go back to 1988. However, the comprehensiveness and quality of the data increased markedly since 1993. We therefore start our sample period from 1993 through 2006 in conducting the restatement analysis, though the results are robust to choosing alternative sample periods.
These data limitations prevent us from conducting the analyses on intrastate branch or interstate deregulation. In this section, we therefore only examine the relationship between interstate branch deregulation and bank restatements. Given the binary distribution of the 9 We primarily follow Audit Analytics in classifying both fraud and some technical and nonsubstantive restatements as financial restatement cases in our hand-collection procedure. These technical or nonsubstantive restatements are related to company reorganizations and restructurings. In addition, we also consider issues related to accounting rules change or reclassification as earnings restatement. More specifically, we count the following non-fraud cases as financial restatement reported in EDGAR: adjustment due to mergers and acquisitions; adjustment due to new accounting principles; adjustment in income statement, balance sheet, or cash flow statement; adjustment due to reclassification or characterization; adjustment due to internal management policies, methodology change, segment revision, allocation between lines of business, measurement change; adjustment due to tax impacts; Adjustment due to error / correction; adjustment due to operation combination / operation closed / operation sales; adjustment due to loans, assets, credit changes, investment; adjustment due to warrants, securities, equity changes; adjustment in cash dividends; adjustment in share outstanding, stock value, stock dividends, or stock distribution; earnings per share or dividends adjustment because of stock split; earnings per share adjustment or other adjustment because of dividends payment. dependent variable, we use a probit regression model and report the marginal effects. We confirm the results using OLS. In the analyses, we control for year and BHC fixed effects.
As reported in Table 6 , interstate branch deregulation reduced the odds of banks restating their earnings. The coefficient estimates in columns 1 indicate that the passage of the IBBEA deregulation reduces the odds of banks' earnings restatement by 10%, holding everything else constant. A drawback of using the probit model with fixed effects is the potential incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948) . The fixed effects model draws inferences about common parameters and places very little structure on the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. However, using a nonlinear model, such as probit model, noise in the estimation of individual level effects will contaminate estimates of the common parameters when the time dimension is short. In addition, in our case, many observations are automatically dropped from the regression due to the zero within-variance problem. We therefore also run a set of OLS regressions using similar specifications to check the robustness of our results and report the OLS estimates in column 2 of Table 6 . We find that the marginal effects of interstate branch deregulation on reducing the odds of earnings restatement is about 6%. These results are not only statistically significant, but also similar in terms of magnitude compared to those estimates from the probit model.
In columns 3-4 of Table 6 , we also present the dynamic effects of the interstate branch deregulation on the odds of financial restatement, where financial restatement is modeled by leads and lags from two years before to eight years or more after the interstate branch deregulation. The reference group is the interstate branch deregulation year.
These analyses show that (1) changes in financial restatements do not occur before deregulation, (2) deregulation triggers a reduction in financial restatements, and (3) the impact of deregulation on restatement grows over time. The post-deregulation coefficients starting from the second year are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
Other Robustness Tests
Besides the robustness tests discussed above, we conducted a series of sensitivity analyses to assess the sensitivity of the results. To save space, we describe these robustness tests but do not present the regression results, which are available upon request.
First, we were concerned that the management of information might have changed after the 2004 Basel II Accord because it required more stringent risk-based capital requirements. Thus, we re-did the analyses restricting the sample to before 2004. The results hold for this restricted sample period and the coefficient estimates are very similar.
Second, Liu and Ryan (2006) argue that the ability of banks to manage earnings is constrained by whether they hold homogeneous or heterogeneous loans. To confirm our results from the baseline regression are robust to the loan heterogeneity, we include additional loan type control variables. Specifically, we control for loans secured by real estate, commercial and industrial loans, loans to finance agricultural production, individual loans, and loans to foreign governments, where all of the loan type variables are scaled by the size of total loans. Controlling for the nature of the different loans yields very similar results, both in terms of significance and in terms of the economic sizes of the coefficient estimates.
Third, we examined discretionary LLPs at the subsidiary bank level. There are material disadvantages to conducting the analyses at the subsidiary level. First, a BHC's subsidiaries are probably subject to the same accounting policies as the parent organization.
Second, subsidiaries are typically not publicly listed, so that market capitalization and other data are typically unavailable for subsidiary banks. One advantage of conducting the analyses at the subsidiary level, however, is that we can identify exactly which bank subsidiary is influenced by the interstate banking deregulation.
To do the subsidiary-level analyses, we use the commercial bank dataset published on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website to merge these subsidiary banks with BHCs in our main sample. We exclude those stand-alone banks or banks that do not belong to any BHCs. We end up with a sample of 68,320 bank-quarter observations. However, because some of the banks are lack of capitalization information, our final subsidiary bank data contains 56,129 observations, with 2,931 subsidiary banks spanning from the third quarter of 1986 until 2006. Again, we have excluded the state of Delaware and South Dakota from the sample. These subsidiary banks belong to 888 BHCs (out of 911 BHCs) in our main sample.
The results using the BHC subsidiaries are virtually identical to those using the consolidated BHC. The results are similar both in terms of coefficient estimates and in terms of statistical significance.
Finally, there is considerable exit and entry over this period of active merger and acquisition activity this deregulatory period. To assess whether selection on particular traits drives our findings, we conduct the analyses only for BHCS that exists for the full sample.
All of the results hold.
Conclusion
In this paper, we find that bank regulatory reforms that eased impediments to competition among U.S. BHCs reduced abnormal accruals of LLPs. This paper contributes to our understanding of how regulations influence the private governance and regulatory oversight of banks. Theory provides conflicting predictions about the impact of regulatory reforms that intensify competition on bank opacity. Some models predict that competition will induce the executives of banks to manipulate information either to hinder the entry of potential competitors or to extract as many private rents as possible in the short-run because competition makes the long-run viability of the bank uncertain. Other models stress that competition will enhance efficiency, reduce managerial slack, and force banks to disclose more accurate information.
The evidence suggests that bank deregulations that removed barriers to the geographic expansion of banks boosted disclosure quality by intensifying competition among banks.
There is no evidence that intensifying competition makes it more difficult for private investors to discipline banks or regulators to supervise them. The findings are consistent with the view that exposing BHCs to greater competition will facilitate the monitoring of banks, with potentially beneficial repercussion on the governance and regulation of banks.
Figure 1: Evolution of Discretionary LLPs around Interstate Bank Deregulation
Note: This figure plots the impact of interstate bank deregulation on discretionary LLPs by banks in a state. For each state, year zero is the year the state started interstate bank deregulation, such that one quarter before deregulation is -1 and one quarter after deregulation is +1. We consider a 20-quarter window, spanning from ten quarters before until ten quarters after deregulation. The figure reports estimated coefficients from the following regression:
where the deregulation dummy variable D !" !! equals one for banks in the nth quarter after deregulation, and the deregulation dummy variable D !" !! equals one for banks in the nth quarter before deregulation, and ! and ! are state-quarter and BHC fixed effects, respectively. The solid line denotes the estimated coefficients ( ! , ! , …), while the dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The graph is normalized by the pre-deregulation (period -10 through -1) mean. 
Figure 2: Discretionary LLPs over EBTP around Interstate Bank Deregulation
Note: This figure plots the impact of interstate bank deregulation on discretionary LLPs (scaled by EBTP) by BHCs in a state. For each state, year zero is the year the state started interstate bank deregulation, such that one quarter before deregulation is -1 and one quarter after deregulation is +1. We consider a 20-quarter window, spanning from ten quarters before until ten quarters after deregulation. The figure reports the median of the absolute value of discretionary LLPs divided by EBTP. EBTP is defined as income before taxes, provisions recognized in income (in million $), and discretionary LLP is the absolute value of discretionary LLPs estimated from equation (1) multiplied by the value of the lag of total loans (in million $). Discretionary LLPs over EBTP -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarters relative to interstate deregulation The natural logarithm of one plus the number of states whose BHCs can enter into the home state in period t. Ln(# of States -Distance Weighted)
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of other states whose can enter the home state in period t, where each of those other states is weighted by the inverse of its distance to the home state. Ln(# of BHCs from Other States) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of BHCs from other states that can enter the home state in period t.
BHC__DIS
Computed as follows: For each BHC in each period, weight its assets across all subsidiaries by the regulatory environment facing each subsidiary (including the subsidiaries in the state of the BHC's headquarters). To calculate the regulatory environment facing each subsidiary in each year, we measure the distance from each subsidiary bank to the capital of every other state, and for each subsidiary in a state k, weight the interstate deregulation between state k and every other state in period t by that subsidiary's distance to the other state. As before, we take the natural logarithm of the sum of the weighted distance. BHC _DIS_NUM Computed as follows: For each BHC in each period, weight its assets across all subsidiaries by the regulatory environment facing each subsidiary (including the subsidiaries in the state of the BHC's headquarters). To calculate the regulatory environment facing each subsidiary in each year, we measure the distance from each subsidiary bank to the capital of every other state, and for each subsidiary in a state k, weight the interstate deregulation between state k and every other state in period t by that subsidiary's distance to the other state, and further weight by the number of BHCs in the other state. As before, we take the natural logarithm of the sum of the BHC-weighted distance. BHC_DIS_GSP Computed as follows: For each BHC in each period, weight its assets across all subsidiaries by the regulatory environment facing each subsidiary (including the subsidiaries in the state of the BHC's headquarters). To calculate the regulatory environment facing each subsidiary in each year, we measure the distance from each subsidiary bank to the capital of every other state, and for each subsidiary in a state k, weight the interstate deregulation between state k and every other state in period t by that subsidiary's distance to the other state, and further weight by the economic size (GSP per capita in $10,000) of each of the other state. As before, we take the natural logarithm of the sum of the GSP-weighted distance.
Firm Level Variables logSIZE
The natural logarithm of total assets in million $ 
Predicting D-LLP By Including Deregulation Measures
This table presents results of the effects of banking deregulations on discretionary loan loss provisions. The sample consists of BHC-quarter observations from the third quarter of 1986 through 2006. The dependent variable, discretionary loan loss provisions, is measured as the natural logarithm of the absolute value of residuals from the following equation (1): INTER is a dummy variable equal to one if a BHC is headquartered in a state that has passed an interstate bank deregulation, and zero otherwise. Ln (# of States) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of states whose BHCs can enter into the home state in period t. Ln (# of States-Distance Weighted) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of other states whose can enter the home state in period t, where each of those other states is weighted by the inverse of its distance to the home state. Ln (# of BHCs from Other States) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of BHCs from other states that can enter the home state in period t. INTRA is a dummy variable that equals one if a BHC is headquartered in a state that has removed restrictions on intrastate branching through mergers and acquisitions, and zero otherwise. INTER-BRANCH is a dummy variable that equals one if the BHC is headquartered in a state that has liberalized restrictions on BHCs in others from establishing bank branches. Table 1 defines the other regressors. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent, clustered at the state-quarter level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (1): one (columns 1-3) or two of the deregulation measures (columns 4-9) (INTER, Ln (# of States), BHC_DIS, BHC_DIS_NUM, BHC _DIS_GDP) corresponding to the deregulation measures used in columns 1-9 of this table. BHC_DIS is computed as follows: For each BHC in each period, weight its assets across all subsidiaries by the regulatory environment facing each subsidiary (including the subsidiaries in the state of the BHC's headquarters). To calculate the regulatory environment facing each subsidiary in each year, we measure the distance from each subsidiary bank to the capital of every other state, and for each subsidiary in a state k (k = j if headquarter state), weight the interstate deregulation between state k and every other state in period t by that subsidiary's distance to the other state. We use BHC_DIS to represent this bank-specific regulatory environment index. We further weight this regulatory environment index by (a) the number of BHCs in the other state (BHC_DIS_NUM) or (b) the economic size (GSP per capita in $10,000) of the other state (BHC_DIS_GSP). We take the natural logarithm of the sum of the weighted distance measures. Table 1 defines all the other regressors. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent, clustered at the state-quarter level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Table 6. Financial Restatement After the Banking Deregulation
This table presents regression results of the (dynamic) effects of interstate branching deregulation on the incidence of financial restatements. The sample consists of BHC-year observations from year 1993 through 2006.The dependent variable, the incidence of financial restatement (RESTATEMENT), equals one if the BHC restates its financial restatements in year t and zero otherwise INTER-BRANCH is defined as a dummy variable takes the value of one if the BHC is headquartered in a state that has the State Interstate Branching Laws takes effective by the beginning of year t, and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3 and 5 use probit regression models, and present estimated marginal effects (dy/dx). The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable from 0 to 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 use OLS. INTER-BRANCH is a dummy variable that equals one if the BHC is headquartered in a state that has liberalized restrictions on BHCs in others from establishing bank branches. Columns 3-6 present results of the dynamic effects, where financial restatement is modeled by (leads and) lags (from years before) to five years or more after the interstate branch deregulation. The reference group is the interstate branch deregulation year. Table 1 defines the other regressors. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent, clustered at the state-year level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) This table presents results of the effects of banking deregulations on alternative measures of discretionary loan loss provisions. The sample consists of BHC-quarter observations from the third quarter of 1986 through 2006. The dependent variable, discretionary loan loss provisions, is measured as the natural logarithm of the absolute value of residuals predicted from each of the following models. INTER is a dummy variable equal to one if a BHC is headquartered in a state that has passed an interstate bank deregulation, and zero otherwise. Ln (# of States) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of states whose BHCs can enter into the home state in period t. Table 1 defines the other regressors. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent, clustered at the state-quarter level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
